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Evaluation of the Judicial System: Basic Principles 
 
Over the last several years the judicial system has turned into one of the most 
serious problems in the eyes of the public in Bulgaria. The distrust of the citizens 
towards its institutions has reached dramatic levels. The courts, the prosecutorial 
office and the bodies of investigation receive negative evaluation of their 
performance by some 70-71% of the citizens.1 (In contrast, half of the citizens 
evaluate positively the work of the police, for instance.) The increased pressure on 
the part of the EU for reforms of the judicial system has further strengthened the 
impression of the citizens that the judicial system is a central, if not the central 
problem the country faces. The media language with respect to the judiciary is 
extremely negative. One could often hear it described as “non-working”, “slow”, 
“cumbersome” and “inefficient.” These statements are usually supported by 
anecdotal evidence and scandalous stories uncritically accepted as representative 
of the activities of the system as a whole.  
  
As it often happens in our public life, many of the arguments in the debates, 
including the debate on the judicial system, come down to metaphors and 
hyperboles. One of the popular metaphors for the system, for example, depicts it as 
a graveyard, from which one cannot expect internal support for reforms.  Extreme 
hyperboles like the one “we do not have a judicial system” are also favorite of the 
media. Using such linguistic tools is not a problem by itself – they mobilize the 
public attention in certain direction and give an opportunity for wider circles of 
people to join a debate, which is in danger of degenerating into a closed exercise 
for experts.  
 
With time, however, the metaphors and the hyperboles tend to become perceived 
as a cognitive tool rather than a motivational one. Simply put, the society is in 
danger to fall into a cynicism trap – it becomes convinced, that the judicial system 
is deeply corrupt and inefficient, and is getting tired of all talk about reforms and 
innovative policies with respect to the judiciary. 
                                                 
1
 According to data from Alfa Research Agency for the beginning of 2006. 
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The Centre for Liberal Strategies hopes that the present report will contribute to 
avoid the trap of societal cynicism by defending two key principles in the 
evaluation of the performance of the judicial system: priority of the point of view 
of the citizen and objectivity of evaluation. 
  
• Priority of the point of view of the citizen. Any analysis and evaluation 
should put the interests of the citizens prior to the narrowly interpreted 
bureaucratic interests of the magistrates and the administration. The citizens 
are concerned mainly with the quality of the ultimate “product” of the 
judicial system, measured against the input of public resources. They are 
concerned primarily about the quality of the output – completed cases, 
judicial decisions, convictions in reasonable time - and not about the 
segmented work of different bodies and institutions, however important 
this might be from a bureaucratic point of view. 
 
Due to the normative priority of the citizen, the present report aims at presenting a 
more comprehensive picture of the workings of the Bulgarian judicial system. No 
matter how simple this enterprise seems, it meets a series of difficulties. First, the 
reports of the different judicial bodies and institutions are prepared separately and 
in practice are rather mechanically summarized. The Supreme Judicial Council 
does the summary work, but their analysis does not include the performance of the 
Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, who produce 
their own separate reports. The Prosecutorial Office itself summarizes its own data 
and prepares its own separate reports.  The Investigation bodies also prepare their 
own separate reports. Secondly, this practice of fragmented accountability hinders 
the analytical evaluation of the work of the judicial system; in fact, there is no 
single analytical report, evaluating the performance of the judicial system as a 
whole. In this context, the point of view of the citizen is lost: the public is flooded 
with performance data having meaning and significance exclusively for the 
workings of the separate institutions and not for the system as a whole.  
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This problem presented us with a twofold task. First, to sift only that information, 
which could serve the citizen in her own evaluation of the quality and the 
efficiency of the judicial procedures. Secondly, wherever such information is 
missing, to attempt to compensate for this lack by undertaking innovative research. 
 
The results are encouraging. On the one hand, the Supreme Judicial Council, acting 
upon the recommendation of the Working group of our Project, requested from the 
courts, the investigation bodies and the prosecutorial offices additional 
information specifically on the delay of civil and criminal cases. The new matrix for 
gathering information could be used in the future as well. On the other hand, 
together with the sociological agency Alpha Research we undertook a first-of-its-
kind survey of the overall duration of different types of civil and criminal cases. The 
method of this research for the first time makes it possible to calculate the total 
duration of all judicial and the pre-trial phases, as well as the time a case “spends” 
in-between institutions, which is far from negligible, as we shall see. The 
contribution of this research will be even greater, if its methodology becomes a tool 
for periodic measurement of the duration of cases, since it gives a far more detailed 
information than the currently observed indicators. 
 
• Objectivity of the indicators. The second principle, followed in our report, is 
the principle of objectivity of evaluation. The popular perceptions of the 
workings of the system are, of course, important, but it is possible that they 
are not fully congruent with reality due to the excessive use of metaphors 
and hyperboles in the public discourse.  The objective indicators for the 
workings of the system, focused predominantly on the ratio between public 
resources and work done/output of the system, are the backbone of the 
evaluative tools, used in the present report. 
For this purpose, in addition to the official reports of the courts, the prosecutorial 
office and the investigation bodies, we have used our own original field research: 
the already mentioned survey of the duration of judicial procedures, as well as 
studies on the coordination between the institutions in the fight against organized 
crime. We have further used information from publications of leading NGOs. We 
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have sought as well to put the problems in comparative perspective, by providing 
data on the work of the judicial systems in other countries. 
 
Finally, the evaluation of the workings of the judicial system has to be put in a 
wider social context. This means that its problems have to be weighed against 
problems in other areas, as well as against the priorities of our country in a longer-
term perspective. The proximity of the much-desired EU membership turns (quite 
rightly) our attention to those issues, which would ease the dialogue with Brussels 
and would guarantee our admission as a respected member of one of the most 
developed politico-economic communities in the  contemporary world. No one 
should underestimate the importance of this goal. But it should not be an excuse 
for turning our back to other important for us issues, such as the state of public 
services and the general welfare of the people.  
 
Of course, the role of the judicial system for the overall well-being of people is not 
at all negligible. On the contrary, it is a truism that the rule of law is a key element 
for the success of a market economy and for the consolidation of democracy. But 
the rule of law goes much beyond the judicial system – it is a principle, which has 
to pervade all societal spheres in Bulgaria. If this does not happen, no matter how 
effective the judicial system is, its effect will be overall limited. An illustration will 
serve well here. According to surveys on corruption in Bulgaria for 2005, the 
number of corrupt deals was approx. 1.5 million (around 130 000/ a month).2  All 
prosecutorial acts on all types of crimes, introduced by the prosecutors in the 
courts for 2005, are 51 414. The disproportion between these two numbers reveals 
the illusion that the judicial system on its own could be a sufficient guarantor of the 
normative foundations of a society.  
 
For all of the above mentioned reasons, in this report we attempt to strike a balance 
between the legitimate expectations of the citizens for efficiency of the judicial 
system, and the objective reality of its workings. The balance between the 
                                                 
2
 Антикорупционните pеформи в България на прага на членството в Европейския съюз, Център за 
изследване на демокрацията, 2006 г. Anticorruption reforms in Bulgaria on the Doorway to European 
Membership, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2006. 
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principles of the citizen perspective and objective evaluation of performance is the 
tool that could best serve as a corrective to unwarranted and inflated expectations, 
a tool which at the same time will avoid the further alienation of the citizens from 
the debates on the judicial system. 
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Main Conclusions and Evaluation 
 
• In contrast with already well-established popular perceptions of the 
Bulgarian judicial system as ineffective, cumbersome and corrupt, the 
analysis of objective indicators of its performance presents a different and 
far more nuanced picture. For most of its activities the system meets 
European standards and does not differ substantially from the practices of 
other European countries and EU member states. According to some main 
efficiency indicators – as the length of judicial procedures, workloads, the 
cost of completed cases, and public funding - the Bulgarian judicial system 
is altogether comparable with those of the EU member states. The findings 
of our study are supported by previous research done by the Commission 
on the Efficiency of Judicial Systems of the Council of Europe.3 According to 
the results of their comparative research, the Bulgarian judicial system does 
not exhibit any major deviation from European averages in terms of length 
of proceedings (for robberies, divorces and employment cases), workloads 
of magistrates, numbers of courts and magistrates, public funding as 
proportion from national budgets.   
 
• According to the findings of our original field research, in terms of duration 
of trial and pre-trial procedures as an indicator for the efficiency of the 
judicial system, Bulgaria does not seem to differ substantially from the 
practices in other EU member countries. The total average length of civil 
cases is 350 days in Bulgaria. For criminal cases of common character it is 
835 days, as the duration of the pre-trial phase (investigation) is included 
into this number. (See Tables 6 and 7 as well as charts 24-26 for more 
details).  It should be stressed that we do not have data for EU countries 
gathered using our methodology – so comparisons will be by necessity 
incomplete. Nevertheless, by using data from the CEPEJ survey, and despite 
the fact that European practices are rather diverse in terms of length of 
                                                 
3
 European Judicial Systems 2002: Facts and Figures on the Basis of a Survey Conducted in 40 Council of 
Europe States, European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), April 2005, Belgium 
(electronically available at the website of CEPEJ). 
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proceedings and waiting times, it seems warranted to assume that there is 
no major problem with the length of judicial procedures in Bulgaria, as 
compared to other countries. Yet, our judicial system is definitely not a high 
scorer in any of the monitored by CEPEJ categories – we are rather in the 
middle, and possibly more towards the bottom-end regarding criminal 
cases (Still there are EU member states with comparable and worse results).  
Apart from providing a yardstick for further, more precise measurements of 
the duration of judicial proceedings, our study shows is that there is a 
considerable “in-between- institutions” time, which the cases spend 
between two courts, or between the court and the prosecutorial office. There 
is a serious potential for optimization in this regard, should the necessary 
administrative and legislative measures be adopted. 
 
• With respect to criminal cases, it is the duration of the pre-trial phase which 
draws the attention (See Table 6). The accumulated duration here is 541 
days, which is the overall time in the investigation and the prosecutorial 
offices (i.e. including the time, during which cases are sent back for further 
investigation). This demonstrates that the pre-trial phase accounts for the 
better part of the duration of a common criminal case (835 days altogether). 
One should not immediately jump from here to the conclusion that the pre-
trial phase is inefficient, because other explanations are also possible. To 
begin with, the duration of the pre-judicial phase should be read together 
with the information about the “super efficiency” of the prosecutorial office, 
demonstrated by the ratio between convictions and acquittals: around 80% 
convictions as against only around 1% acquittals of all indicted persons. (See 
Chart 18.) When these two facts are combined, it is quite possible to 
conclude that in our criminal judicial system there is a “fear” of acquittals. 
This increases considerably the relative weight of the pre-trial phase: either 
the prosecutors and investigators have collected sufficient evidence for 
conviction, or the case is referred back to them for further investigation. It is 
possible that the tendency to refer cases back increases the duration of the 
pre-trial phase.  
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• The fact that as a whole the judicial system functions satisfactorily does not 
mean that there are no considerable problems in some specific spheres. 
These problems concern limited in size but yet very important spheres such 
as the fight against organized crime, money laundering, high-level 
corruption. In these spheres the system faces apparent problems. It is 
difficult to place the difficulties the Bulgarian judicial system faces in 
comparative perspective, because of lack of data. Yet, the level of 
unresolved contract killing cases, the lack of convictions for participation in 
organized groups, the excessive focus on petty corruption as opposed to 
high-level political corruption are sufficient indicators of serious problems. 
(See Charts 19-21. See also the Excerpt from the Report of the Prosecutorial 
Office, on contract killings in Part IV below.)  
 
• The budget of the judicial system as a whole is adequate and has a 
considerable growth in the last years. In absolute terms the country spends 
less for justice than the other European countries, but this is explained by 
the difference in the living standards and in the economic development. As 
a percentage from the country’s budget, it is comparable to that in the other 
European countries. For the last three years there is a significant increase in 
the cost of a completed case in Bulgaria, which is explained by the increase 
in the budget, while maintaining a comparably stable workload (See Chart 5 
below). The increased public funds for the judicial system and the more 
expensive final products give grounds to the citizens to expect a better 
quality for these final products. (See section I of the report below.) 
 
• It is of special importance for the judicial system to develop tools for annual 
monitoring of the quality of the “final” output of the judicial system, 
compared to the input of resources. The present report is a first attempt to 
take a snap-shot of the situation, which makes it possible to monitor the 
further development and to evaluate the trends in the work of the judicial 
system.  
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• From this perspective it is encouraging, that the new amendments of the 
Constitution introduced forms of accountability for the top magistrates and 
procedures of reporting before the Parliament. The problem with the chosen 
institutional solution, however, is that each of the three chief magistrates – 
the heads of the two supreme courts and the prosecutor general – prepare 
reports on the work of their own institution only. In this way the already 
established practice of fragmented accountability is further reinforced, 
which hinders the analysis of the system as a whole. There is no need for 
new Constitutional amendment to overcome this difficulty. What simply 
needs to be done is, within the framework of an inter-institutional dialogue, 
to develop a mechanism, through which the judicial system - represented by 
the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) itself or by its representatives - informs 
the Parliament and the wider public about the comprehensive picture of its 
performance, presented and analyzed by means of a limited number of key 
indicators.   
 
• The analysis of the indicators of the performance of the system with respect 
to organized crime and corruption uncovers serious problems. There are 
almost no convictions for participation in organized criminal groups – the 
statistical data lumps together all “organised-crime-related cases” thus 
concealing the difficulties in proving membership in organised groups. This 
“lumping” exercise is probably the explanation for the reported increase of 
indictments and convictions for the period 2003-2005. (See Chart 20) This 
means that the investigative bodies work “one piece at a time” and 
experience considerable difficulties in infiltrating and unraveling criminal 
networks. As a result, the convicted are convicted for individual crimes, 
while their alleged participation into organised groups remains unproven, 
and in that sense is not being punished. Similar is the situation with the 
money laundering issue, where the ineffectiveness of the institutions is also 
troubling. The so called “contract killings” also demonstrate very low levels 
of indictments and convictions. (See the Excerpt from the Report of the 
Prosecutorial Office, on contract killings in Part IV below.) 
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• With respect to the fight against corruption, the measured progress is 
unsatisfactory. (see Chart 21.)  For the 2003-2005 period, the number of 
convicted persons and the number of indictments (the rough ratio is 
380/700) is relatively stable. Probably it is more important to introduce a 
more precise statistics, separating the low-level from the higher-level 
corruption. The current indicator includes a great number of relatively 
minor crimes, for the greater part of which there are relatively mild 
convictions,   which does not reflect the weight of the public interest in the 
forms of high-level “political” corruption. In this sense it is telling that our 
judicial system stays “out” of certain sensitive spheres, like political party 
financing, for example. On such issues there are in practice no cases. 
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Indicators 
 
In this part of the report we present a list of indicators for the evaluation of the 
efficiency of the judicial system. First, we list possible indicators for each one of 
ten spheres, which we believe present a synthetic image of the working of the 
system as a whole. After that we adduce empirical data for each one of the 
indicators, where available. With respect to the duration of the judicial 
procedures we have conducted a detailed study, the results of which have been 
made public at the Conference The Judiciary: Independent and Accountable held on 
April 20th 2006 in Sofia. 
 
I. Public Resources 
 
Indicators 
- public resources necessary for maintaining the judicial system in other 
European countries 
- comparison of the generalized budget of the courts, the prosecutorial office 
and the investigation for the last three years; 
- proportion of the salaries of the magistrates and the funds for infrastructure 
and equipment of the system (capital spending), computerization and so on, 
as part of the overall budget; 
- price of a completed case: budget/number of completed cases 
 
1. The Relative Share of the Budget of the Judicial System as Part of the 
Budget of the Republic: 
  2003 – 2.40% - 141 882 800 leva 
  2004 – 3.25% - 205 220 000 leva 
  2005 – 3.21% - 230 105 300 leva4 
 
                                                 
4
 In 2005 with the Law on the State Budget, a budget for the Prosecutorial office was set, amounting to 
51 000 000 leva, which  limited in times the capacity for meeting even the most necessary needs of the work 
of prosecutors and the administration in this sphere. 80% of this budget was to be spent on salaries and social 
security payments. This led to demanding from the Supreme Judicial Council of additional targeted financial 
means and to a revision of the budget. As a result the total budget of this sphere was increased and at the end 
of the year it amounted to 53 362 843 leva in total.  
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Chart 1. The Budget of the Judicial System in Leva 
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Chart 2. Budget of the Judicial System as a Percentage of the Budget of the 
Republic 
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2. Public Spending on the Judicial System  Per Capita of the Population 
 
  2003 – 18,18 leva; or 9,32 Euro 
  2004 – 26,44 leva; or 13,56 Euro 
  2005 - 29,81 leva; or 15,29 Euro 
 
3. Comparative survey of the financing of courts and the prosecutorial 
offices in Europe for 2002, in Euro/per capita of the population (Source: 
The Council of Europe): 
  
 14 
Chart 3. Comparative Survey of the financing of judicial systems in some 
European countries – in Euro/per capita of the population  
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Summary of the data from the report of the Commission on the Efficiency of the Judicial 
Systems of the Council of Europe for 2002 
 
With respect to the financial resources for the judicial system, Bulgaria spends 3.53 
Euro/per capita for its courts and 0.41 Euro/per capita for legal aid. To compare, 
Finland - 41 and 9.98 Euro/capita respectively, Belgium - 64 and 3.9 Euro/capita 
and Switzerland - 103 and 7 Euro/capita spend most. The countries in Central 
Europe also spend considerably more in absolute terms – Slovenia - 51 and NA, 
Hungary - 21 and NA, and the Check Republic - 21 and 0.84 Euro. Only Romania  - 
- 5.4 and 0.08, and Russia - 4.63 and 0.01 are comparable with the amount we spent, 
as well as Georgia and Turkey.  
If those financial resources are counted as percentage of the state budget, then 
Bulgaria spends 1% for its courts and for legal aid, which gives it a place within the 
European family in the middle of the scale. We get the same result if these 
resources are measured as percentage from the average salary – then Bulgaria, 
with its 0.2 % is again in the middle of the scale. Before us are Serbia, Portugal, 
Hungary, Slovenia, the Check Republic, Croatia, Slovakia, Poland. One could 
conclude from here, that post-communist countries that have managed to 
implement more successful reforms of their judicial systems have spent more 
resources on them.  
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With respect to the budget for the prosecutorial office, Bulgaria spends 1.96, which 
sends it again in the lower end of the scale. Hungary, for example, spends 10.67 
Euro per capita. As percentage of the national budget, however, our country is 
again in the middle. As a percentage of the average salary, moreover, we are 
among the first four countries in the scale, which shows that the spending in this 
part is adequate with respect to the available resources in the country.  
 
4. Structure of the Spending in the Budget of the Judicial System in 
Percents. 
 
Chart 4. Spending Breakdown of the Budget of the Judicial System 
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The salaries and the honoraria of the administrative staff, the social security 
payments included, amount to more than half of the spending in the budget of the 
judicial system. 
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5. Cost per case completed 
 
Table 1.  Cases completed by the courts 
 
 
Cases Completed 2003 2004 2005 
Courts 417 325 426 085 458 315 
Supreme 
Administrative 
Court 
12 156 10 955 12 493 
Supreme 
Cassation  
Court 
17 000 17 000 17 000 
Total 446 481 454 040 487 808 
Budget/number 
cases 
317,78 leva 451,99 leva 471,71 leva 
 
 
Chart 5. Cost per case completed 
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II. Workload of the Judicial System 
 
- workload in the pre-trial phase: number of prosecutors per number of 
indictments, number of convicted persons 
- workload in the judicial phase: number of cases per number of judges; cases 
introduced and cases completed. 
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1. Number of Positions for Judges  
 
Table 2. Number of Judges in the Courts 
 
 2003 г. 2004 г. 2005 г. 
Courts 1521 1547 1582 
Supreme 
Administrative 
Court 
NA NA 67 
Supreme 
Cassation  
Court 
NA NA 83 
Total NA NA 1732 
 
 
2. The Workload of the Courts 
 
Chart 6. The workload of the courts 
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3. Workload with respect to cases completed 
 
For all courts in the country: on average 281,6 cases per judge for 2005 
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Table 3. Workload of individual judges with respect to cases completed 
 
2005  Number of 
Judges 
Cases Completed Work Load 
Supreme 
Administrative 
Court 
67 12 493 192 cases 
Supreme 
Cassation Court 
83 17 000 204 cases 
Appellate 100 9 352 93,52 cases 
Regional 553 108 032 195,35 cases 
District Regional 369 152 257 412,62 cases 
District 335 96 086 286,82 cases 
Sofia city court 118 36 565 309,87 cases 
Sofia district court 119 53 324 448,1 cases 
 
 
Chart 7. Workload of individual judges in different courts with respect to cases 
completed 
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CPC- Sofia district court 
R – District courts in main cities 
SCC – Sofia City Court 
DC – Other district courts 
Scas- Supreme Court of Cassation 
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Region – Regional courts 
SAC – Supreme administrative court 
AC- Appellate courts  
 
4. Workload in 2003, 2004 and 2005 (Supreme Administrative Court and Supreme 
Court of Cassation excluded) 
 
Table 4. Workload of individual judges in the Courts (SAC and SCC excluded) 
 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
Cases Heard 563 250 570 019 584 455 
Cases Completed 417 325 426 085 458 315 
Number of 
Judges 
1 547 1 582 1 635 
    
Workload Cases 
Heard 
364,09 360,31 357,46 
Workload Cases 
Completed 
269,76 269,33 280,31 
 
Chart 8. Average workload of individual judges (judges in SAC and SKC 
excluded). 
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5. Workload in the Prosecutorial office 
 
Excerpt from the Report of the Prosecutorial Office on its Activity from 1999 to 2005  
 
By March 1999, the number of positions for the prosecutors and the 
administrative staff of the Prosecutorial office was 1952 in total.  
By September 1999, this number was increased by 34, and the next year again, 
following a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC).  
In 1999 there were 343 proposals regarding personnel policy to the SJC, 116 of 
which were for taking a position, 58 for promotion, and 58 for dismissal.  
Due to staff outflow and the lack of qualified suitable candidates, the number of 
positions not taken was not constant, but it has increased the most at the end of 
1999 – 54 open positions.  
As a result of the active work with respect to staff issues, objective preconditions 
were created so that most of the open positions were taken already in the first 
quarter of 2000.  
In 2000 there were 35 open positions for magistrates left, 16 of which in the 
military prosecutorial offices. 
The approved by the SJC number of positions for 2001 is 1049 for prosecutors, 
and 1179 for administrative staff.  
The open positions by January 1st 2002 were 48 for prosecutors, 19 of which – for 
district prosecutors, 19 – for military-regional prosecutors, and 10 in the Supreme 
Administrative and the Supreme Cassation Prosecutorial Offices. Attention was 
given for providing the prosecutorial offices with the necessary administrative 
staff.  
As a result of active work with respect to staff issues, the work conditions in a 
degree were normalized in the predominant number of prosecutorial offices. 
In 2002 the number of positions in the Prosecutorial office is increased to 1089 
prosecutors and 1 259 administrative staff. The additional 40 positions for 
prosecutors and 80 positions for administrative staff are distributed 
predominantly among the district offices.  The number of positions in SCP and 
SAP and the Administrative office of the Chief Prosecutor is not changed. At the 
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end of 2002 the open positions remain 76 for prosecutors, 34 of which in the 
district offices, 29 – in regional and military regional ones, 3 – in appellate offices, 
and 10 in SCP and SAP. 
In 2003 the number of positions is not changed, so is the number of open 
positions. The reason for this is the amendments to the Law on the Judicial 
Power concerning appointment in the bodies of the judicial power, and the 
necessary adoption with this respect of an Order on the Conditions and the 
Procedures for Position Competitions. 
In 2003 the SJC heard 143 proposals for rang promotion and 133 proposals for 
position promotion.  
In 2004 the “Personnel” Department in SCP office have prepared, investigated 
and submitted to SJC 257 proposals in total, 64 of which for appointing high 
administrative officials and prosecutors, 130 for promotion in position, 52 for 
promotion in rank, and 10 for attestation and granting tenure (indismissible 
status)… 
In 2005 there were 1224 positions for prosecutors, compared to number of 1 319 
positions - the proposal projected in the 2005 budget for the Prosecutorial office. 
The same was the situation with the administrative staff positions of the 
Prosecutorial office, which by 31. 12. 2004 were 1 379, compared to the 2005 
budget proposal for 1519 positions…. 
In 2005, 914 proposals were introduced in the SJC, of which for administrative 
heads and their deputies – 173 positions; for prosecutor appointments – 508; for 
promotion in rank – 185; for tenure – 36, and 12 for dismissal.  
In 2005, 47 junior prosecutors were appointed (as a result of selection 
competition), of which 5 in the Sofia district prosecutorial office, and the rest – in 
the rest of the regional prosecutorial offices in the country… 
For 2006 the number of positions is increased – by 15 for the “prosecutor” 
position, and by 26 for the position of “junior prosecutor” and the total number 
of positions approved for the Prosecutorial office is 1 281 positions for 
magistrates and 1 506 for administrative staff… 
In relation to the re-appointment of investigators from the Investigative offices in 
the country to the courts and the prosecutorial offices, as a result of the adoption 
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of the new Criminal Procedural Code, 480 positions for investigators were 
transferred to the Prosecutorial Office of the Republic of Bulgaria. At present, 142 
proposals for re-appointment of investigators as prosecutors in the district offices 
are introduced in the SJC, and some more 300 proposals will be soon introduced.  
 
Table 5. Number of Positions in the Prosecutorial Offices 
 
 2003 2004  (12. 05) 2005 
Number of 
Prosecutorial Positions 
1 089 1 319 1 281 
Number of 
Administrative Staff 
Positions 
1 259 1 519 1 506 
Positions for 
Prosecutors Taken 
1 013 1 224 NA 
Positions for 
Administrative Staff 
Taken 
NA 1 379 NA 
Work Load as 
Submitted Files 
(преписки) Resolved 
per Prosecutor 
292,69 (per 
position) 
314,60 (per 
position taken) 
265,42 (per 
position) 
286,03 (per 
position taken) 
298,91 (per 
position) 
Work Load Acts 
Brought to Court 
(Indictments, 
Agreements, 
78a Penal Code Cases) 
per Prosecutor   
 
39,46 (per 
position) 
42,42 (per position 
taken) 
 
37,54 (per 
position) 
40,46 (per 
position taken) 
 
40,13 (per 
position) 
Work Load Convicted 
Persons per Prosecutor 
40,73 (per 
position) 
43,79 (per position 
taken) 
37,66 (per 
position) 
40,59 (per 
position taken) 
42,62 (per 
position) 
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Chart 9. Workload per Positions in the Prosecutorial Offices 
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III. The Ratio of Civil, Criminal and Administrative Proceedings 
- number of cases in the different proceedings 
- the proportion of contested cases 
 
 
IV. The Structure of Crime Compared to the Structure of the Output of the Judicial System 
- main types of crime, according to the statistics of the police and the 
prosecutorial office 
- main types of indictments 
- main types of cases, finished with convictions 
- relative weight of the crimes, indictments and the convictions on issues of 
great public importance, like organized crime (organized criminal  group, 
smuggling, drugs, human trafficking), corruption, contract killings, etc. 
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Excerpt from the Report of the Prosecutorial Office for 2005. 
The registered crimes in 2005 (against the person and against the property of the 
citizens) are 122 310. Compared to the data on 2004, there is a 5.6% decrease in 
crime.  
The number of resolved crimes is 1 690 per 100 000 population. The percentage of 
crimes resolved is 62%, and it is at the same level as in 2004 (61.3%). 
The intensity of registered crime is 1 690 per 100 000 population, compared to 
1 661 for 2004. 
In 2005 the police has resolved 13 632 cases of economic crime, compared to 
13 749 in 2004, which is 15.2% from all resolved criminal cases. The level of non- 
registered crime of this type remains high.  
 
 
Chart 10. Structure of Registered Crime 
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Chart 11. Structure of Prosecutors’ Acts Brought to Court 
 
 
 
AP – Crimes against general public interests 
 
Excerpt from the Report of the Prosecutorial Office 
Contract killings in 1992 – 2005. 
- 173 cases of “contract” killings by non-identified perpetrators were 
established and described. It was found out, that the resolved cases of 
contract killings were 25, where the perpetrators of 17 of the killings were 
established and indictments against the responsible for these killings are 
brought to court. On some of them there are convictions at the first 
instance.  
- 12 cases were re-opened. The common traits of contract killings were 
analyzed. A project on a methodology in the investigation of this type of 
crime was prepared.  
- (2005) in “Organized Crime and Terrorism” Section of Supreme Cassation 
Prosecutorial Office, 585 files on organized crime-related cases were 
decided. For the same period in this Section there are new 2 595 files, 
according to the register.  Together with cases from a previous period, the 
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prosecutors have taken “under special supervision” and realize 
supervision on more than 122 pre-trial proceedings, compared to 77 for 
the preceding 2004 year.  
 
 
V.  Structure of the Activity in the Pre-trial Phase 
 
- number of submitted files, received by the prosecutors; 
- number of indictments; 
- number of introduced prosecutorial acts; 
- number of agreements (pleas); 
- ratio of convicted against acquitted persons. 
 
Chart 12. Submitted Files Resolved By the Prosecutorial Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 13: Prosecutorial Acts Brought to Court 
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Chart 14. Number of Pre-trial Proceedings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 15. Convictions Executed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. Structure of the Activity in the Judicial Phase 
 
- total number of cases heard by the courts:  heard and completed; 
- percentage of appeals; 
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- percentage of cases referred back for further investigation; 
- number of reversed ministerial acts. 
 
 
Chart 16. Cases heard, cases completed, cases completed within 3 months 
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Chart 17. Cases pending, cases appealed, number of court sittings 
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Chart 18. Percentage of Convicted (first column - green) and Acquitted Persons 
(second column-red) from All Indicted Persons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. Problematic Spheres in the Activity of the Judicial System 
 
- organized crime: indictments, convictions 
- corruption: indictments, convictions 
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Chart 19.  Crimes of High Public Relevance 2005: the proportion between 
number of prosecutors’ acts and the number of indicted persons. First two 
columns – organized crime; second two columns – corruption related crime; 
third two columns – tax fraud; fourth two columns – drug crimes; fifth two 
columns – trafficking in human beings 
 
 
 
Chart 20. Organized Crime and Terrorism 2003-2005: first column – prosecutorial 
acts brought to court; second column – number of indicted persons; third column 
– number of convicted persons 
 
 
 
40 62
15
268
405
160
287
549
169
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2003г. 2004г. 2005г.
Организирана престъпност и тероризъм
Внесени в съда прокурорски актове
Обвиняеми и уличени лица
Осъдени лица
 
287
549
836
1042
364 439
1748
2029
1709
2006
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
за орг.
престъпност
за корупционни
престъпления
за данъчни
престъпления
за наркотици за трафик на
хора
Внесени в съда дела за престъпления
 с висока степен на обществена опасност и интерес
внесени в съда прокурорски
актове
обвиняеми лица по тях
 31 
Chart 21. Corruption Cases 2003-2005 (first column – indictments; second column 
– convicted persons) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII. Duration of Procedures in the Pre-trial Phase 
 
- overall duration of the pre-trial phase 
- ratio judicial/pre-trial phase 
- cases not completed – beyond 9 months, 2 years, 3 years 
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Chart 22. Duration of Completed Preliminary Proceedings (first column – within 
2 months; second column – within  6 months ; third column - within  9 months; 
fourth column – above 9 months  
 
 
 
Chart 23.  Preliminary Proceedings Not Completed by the Prosecutors Office – 
started before 9 months, 2 and 3 years 
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IX. Duration of the Judicial Procedures 
 
- speed of the criminal proceedings 
- speed of civil proceedings 
- speed of administrative proceedings 
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Table 6. Total Duration of Civil Cases 
 
Civil Cases days 
% cases reaching 
that instance 
First Instance 238 100% 
Duration in-between first and second 
instance 82  
Second Instance 227 22% 
Duration in-between second and third 
instance  136  
Third Instance 344 4% 
   
Total Duration 350  
 
 
Table 7. Total Duration of Criminal Cases from the Beginning of the Pre-trial 
Phase 
 
Criminal Cases  
% of cases reaching 
that instance 
Pre-trial Phase 541∗  
First Instance 196 100% 
Duration in-between first and 
second instance 74  
Second Instance 181 15% 
Duration in-between second and 
third instance 56  
Third Instance 192 6% 
   
 Total Duration 835  
 
                                                 
∗
 Accummulated duration of the pre-judicial phase, back referrals for further investigation included. 
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Chart 24. Spread of Total Duration of Criminal Cases by Days 
 
 
Chart 25. Total Duration of Civil Cases (first group of columns – first instance; 
second group of columns – second instance (appeal) ; third group of columns – 
third instance (cassation); third group of columns – general duration 
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Chart 26. Duration of Civil Cases by Types: from left to right – property; 
damages Art. 200; overturned dismissals; joint ownership; damages; commercial; 
contract; labour; family; alimony; marriage; change of alimony; consensual 
divorces  
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X. Disciplinary Procedures against Magistrates 
 
- number of disciplinary procedures; 
- number of sanctions; 
- number of violations; 
- number of procedures, approved by the Supreme Administrative Court. 
 
 
Total number of disciplinary procedures by Dec 31st, 2005: 
 
Excerpt from the report of the Supreme Judicial Council’s Commission on Corruption  
 
By Dec 31st 2005 there are 10 finished  disciplinary procedures. Six of them are 
against judges, two – against prosecutors, and two – against investigators. By 
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Dec 31st 2005 the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council on four of the cases 
are in force as not appealed.  
On the quoted disciplinary cases the Supreme Judicial Council, on grounds of 
art. 170, &1 from the Law on the Judicial Power,  has decided: 
a) imposes a punishment  “dismissal” to an investigator on grounds of 
systematic failure to fulfill the obligations of the position; 
b) imposes a punishment “reprimand-poritzanie” to two prosecutors - for 
failures in supervising legality and for failure to fulfill the obligations of 
the position, respectively; 
c) imposes a punishment to a investigator, which has been terminated with a 
decision of the  disciplinary commission; 
d) imposes a punishment “dismissal” to two judges on grounds of systematic 
failure to fulfill the obligations of their positions;  
e) imposes a punishment “dismissal” to a judge on grounds of violating the 
rules of professional ethical code and for damaging the prestige of the 
judicial power; 
f) imposes a punishment “reprimand-poritzanie” to a judge on grounds of 
failure to fulfill the obligations of the position 
g) imposes a punishment “reprimand-poritzanie” to a judge for actions, 
violating the judicial ethical code.   
 
 
Grounds for the disciplinary punishments in 2005: 
 
Excerpt from the report of the Supreme Judicial Council’s Commission on Corruption 
 
The judges accused have committed the following violations of art. 168, &1 of 
the Law on the Judicial Power: 
a) non-fulfillment and/or retardation of the obligations of the position (11 
cases) 
b) actions in violation of the professional ethical code and/or damage to the 
prestige of the judicial power (2 cases) 
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The prosecutors accused have committed the following violations of art. 168, &1 
of the Law on the Judicial Power: 
a) non-fulfillment of the obligations of the position (5 cases); 
b) violations in supervising the legality and in managing an investigative 
case (2 cases) 
c) actions in violation of the professional ethical code and damaging the 
prestige of the judicial power (1 case). 
 
The investigators have committed the following violations of art. 168, &1 of the 
Law on the Judicial Power: 
a) non-fulfillment of the obligations of the position (5 cases); 
 
 
Excerpt from the report of the Supreme Judicial Council’s Commission on Corruption 
 
The disciplinary proceedings in 2005 are 55% more than those in 2004. Compared 
to 2004, the number of disciplinary proceedings against judges have had 
considerable growth, the number of those against prosecutors is relatively stable, 
and there is a trend of slight decrease in the number of cases against 
investigators.  
Like in 2004, in 2005 there has been disciplinary proceedings  not only against 
magistrates but against administrative heads as well.  
For violation of a type the Supreme Judicial Council has given punishments of 
one and the same type to all separate categories of magistrates. 
With respect to all completed cases, which for 2005 and by March 2006 are 19 
altogether, one could offer the following analysis of the punishments given.  
In 9 cases the decision of the SJC coincides with the proposal of the body that has 
introduced it. 
In 5 cases SJC has rejected the proposal for punishment or has terminated the 
proceeding.  
In 4 other of the concluded cases SJC has given a harsher than the proposed 
punishment. 
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In 1 case SJC has given a milder than the proposed punishment. 
One preliminary proceeding has been terminated. 
In 2005, as in 2004, the SJC and the assigned by him disciplinary commissions 
and reporting magistrates have heard the cases, following the procedural 
requirements, guaranteeing fair process. The average duration of the disciplinary 
cases shows that they are completed within reasonable terms. The Commission on 
Corruption has developed  and proposed to the SJC a project for a register of 
disciplinary proceedings, which is to be kept and maintained by the 
administration of the SJC. This register was approved with decision of the SJC № 
18/ 08. 06. 2005… 
Within the framework of the SJC PHARE Project “ Strengthening the 
Administrative Capacity of SJC and Improvement the Status of Magistrates” 
continues work on developing rules and mechanisms for improving the 
procedure on realizing the disciplinary accountability of the magistrates. The 
final product of this process will contribute to further improvement of this 
activity.  
 
 
Appendix: 
Questions addressed during the final conference and the preliminary 
seminar organized in the framework of the project “Improving the 
Policy Making Capacity of the Bulgarian Judicial System”: 
 
- How is the accountability of the magistrates organized at present? Who 
collects, summarizes and analyzes the information? 
- What is reported? What are the kinds of indicators used for evaluation of 
the activity of the judicial system? 
- Can the constitutional amendments contribute to the rationalization and the 
optimization of the accountability of the magistrates? 
 
Why is the analysis of the reports of the separate institutions important? 
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- There is a confidence deficit with respect to statistics: “Imprisonment of a 
single top criminal speaks much louder for an efficient judicial system than 
all types of statistics and reports.” 
- The preeminent weight of the scandals in shaping of public opinion 
- Use of statistics as management, governing tool rather than as PR for some 
institutions. 
 
Problems  
- Information is fragmented and given institution by institution  
- Lack of systematic measurement and analysis. No informed sifting of the 
important indicators from the secondary ones. Lost in numbers? 
-  Lack of research institutes attached to the institutions, capable of analyzing 
in detail the information and preparing methods for more precise analyses. 
- Still no information on:  
            - consistency of decisions and convictions; 
            - whether the decisions and convictions are dependent on the presence 
of an attorney, on the financial situation of the indicted and the interested 
parties, on their ethnicity, etc.    
- Disproportionate stress on the workload of the magistrates - a purely 
bureaucratic logic; 
- No external evaluation, debate or interest in the performance of judicial 
bodies (apart from the EU monitoring); 
- No measures taken on grounds of systematic analysis of the data presented. 
What is the link with the managerial, governmental decisions? 
- The constitutional amendments: a chance for reform. The parliamentary 
hearing of the reports of the institutions will give an opportunity for 
external evaluation and clarification of the reports. 
- The Parliament has to develop the necessary capacity for a successful 
monitoring  of judicial institutions. 
- What are the high magistrates responsible for? How is this responsibility 
realized?  
 
